The assessment of credibility and reputation of contractors in online auctions is the key issue in providing reliable environment for customer-to-customer e-commerce. Confident reputation rating system is an important factor in managing risk and building customer satisfaction. Unfortunately, most online auction sites employ a very simple reputation rating scheme that utilizes user feedbacks and comments issued after committed auctions. Such schemes are easy to deceive and do not provide satisfactory protection against several types of fraud. In this paper we propose two novel measures of trustworthiness, namely, credibility and density. We draw inspiration from social network analysis and present two algorithms for reputation rating estimation. Our first algorithm computes the credibility of participants by an iterative search of inter-participant connections. Our second algorithm discovers clusters of participants who are densely connected through committed auctions. We test both measures on real-world data and we experimentally compare them with existing solutions.
in 2006 e-commerce transactions will account for 18% of all global sales. Auctions, which are one of the very first forms of economic activity performed by humans, are experiencing a triumphant come-back in electronic form. The model describing online auctions is called customer-to-customer (C2C for short), and its validity and practical usability is well proven by the popularity of online auction sites, such as www.ebay.com, www.ubid.com, www.onsale.com, and many others. Today, more than 250 online auction sites are providing customers with means to trade all possible types of goods using a variety of bidding protocols. More than 1.3 million transactions are committed daily using online auction sites. eBay, the global leader in the online auction market, has over 95 million registered users and processes 5 million transactions each week. At any given point in time there are approximately 12 million items posted on eBay. An examination of the latest financial data published by eBay, the global leader of online auctioning, reveals an astonishing development: for the second quarter of 2005 eBay reported net revenues of $1.09 billion (40% increase year on year), operating income of $380 million (49% increase year on year), and net income of $290 million (53% increase year on year).
Many factors contribute to the huge success of online auctions. Bidders are not constrained by time, bids are placed 24/7 and potential users are given enough time to search for interesting items. The Internet removes also geographical constraints on users, who do not have to physically attend an auction. Abundance of sellers and buyers reduces selling costs and decreases prices of offered goods. Finally, many users describe their bidding experiences as similar to gambling, and offering the highest bid is perceived by them as winning a game.
Online auction sites differ in auction protocols being used. A survey [3] lists main differences: frequency of auctions, bidding, closing, and bumping rules, and types of items. By far the most typical auction protocol is a traditional auction (also known as the English auction), where bidders offer bids on an item until a certain deadline and the highest bid is the winner of the auction. In the First Price Sealed Bid auction each user offers a secret bid. All bids are revealed at the same point in time and the highest bid is the winner of the auction. An interesting type is the Dutch auction, where the calling price for an item is subsequently decreased and the first bid is the winner of the auction. Finally, in the Vickerey auction users offer secret sealed bids and the highest bids wins the auction, but the winner pays the amount equal to the second highest bid. Auction sites differ not only in the auction protocol being used, but the type of items displayed as well. For instance, on www.priceline.com bidders offer bids on commodity items blindly (without knowing the bids of other users) and sellers immediately either accept, or reject the bids.
Apart from offering new and unprecedent possibilities, online auctions provide opportunities for dishonest participants to commit fraud [13] . The lack of physical contact between involved parties decreases the degree of trust exposed by users. According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, 73% of customers who do not participate in e-commerce, refrain from doing so motivated by concerns about the security of payment, delivery issues, and warranty terms. This fear is caused mainly by the growing number of complaints regarding online auctions. American Federal Trade Commission reports that 48% of all complaints concerning e-commerce involved fraud committed in online auctions, with the total loss of $437 million in one year. National Consumers League reveals that 63% of complaints about Internet fraud concerned online auctions, with an average loss of $478 per person. A recent report by Internet Fraud Watch (www.fraud.org) for the year 2005 places online auctions with 42% of all complaints at the first place among Internet scams, easily surpassing such popular scams as Nigerian money offers (8% of all complaints) or phishing (2% of all complaints). IFW suggests that the real number of auction frauds might be as high as 71% but the number of registered complaints is heavily biased due to eBay's reluctance to cooperate with fraud watch websites.
Online fraud can occur during bidding process and after bidding ends. Popular fraudulent practices include bid shielding and bid shilling. Bid shielding consists in providing artificially high bid for an item, thus discouraging other bidders from competing for an item. At the last moment, the shielder withdraws the bid, so the winner of an auction becomes the second highest bidder cooperating with the shielder. Bid shilling consists in using a false bidder identity to drive up the price of an item on behalf of the seller. After the bidding process is over, potential fraud includes refraining from paying (bidder) and sending no merchandise or sending merchandise of lower quality and inconsistent with the offer (seller). Recently, online auction sites reported an increasing number of complaints about "accumulation" fraud: a seller builds up the reputation by selling many low-value merchandise (e.g., small collectibles) over a long period of time. After such initial investment the seller presents an offer containing expensive goods (usually video equipment, computer hardware, cellular phones), often using the "buy now" mechanism. "Buy now" auction is an auction without bidding, a given number of goods is offered at a fixed price and the first bidders to offer that price are the winners of the auction. Needless to say, none of the winners ever gets to receive offered goods. All the above mentioned types of fraud are very dangerous from the economical point of view, because they undermine the trust that users develop toward the online auction site and decrease the reputation of the service, which can be disastrous to the online auction.
One of the mechanisms to build trust between anonymous participants of online auctions are reputation systems [11] . Trust and fairness of competition are perceived by auction participants as fundamental issues in developing a successful customerto-customer market [10] . Furthermore, reputation of sellers has an economically observable and statistically significant effect on item prices [6] . Unfortunately, reputation systems currently used by online auction sites are very simple and do not provide enough protection from malicious users. Typically, the reputation of a participant is simply a cumulative sum of auction feedbacks, where each auction is judged by the other party as "positive" (+1), "neutral" (0), or "negative" (−1). Such simple schema is both unreliable and fraud-prone, because dishonest users can easily deceive the reputation system into assigning unfairly high reputation ratings. A seller can create a set of virtual bidders (registering a new user is free and the physical existence of a person is not verified) who will "win" seller's auctions and provide the seller with additional positive feedback points. This technique is known as "ballot stuffing" and it biases the entire system, because unearned reputation allows the seller to obtain more bids and higher prices from other users [9, 12] . In order to better disguise this fraudulent practice, the seller could create a network of auctions between virtual bidders, thus turning them into a clique. Consequently, virtual bidders would pretend to be more credible. Another possibility is to use virtual bidders to provide artificially negative feedbacks to seller's competitors. This technique, sometimes referred to as "bad-mouthing", is more difficult to implement, because it requires to actually win a competitor's auction. Nevertheless, if the gain of driving a competitor out of the market exceeds the investment cost, bad-mouthing can be beneficial. Finally, simple reputation systems are very susceptible to the "accumulation" fraud described earlier, because they accentuate the number of auctions rather than the value of auctions. As the result, sellers are encouraged to sacrifice the quality of service for the volume of sales.
One thing that should be stressed is the fact, that sellers and buyers are exposed to different types of risk. Sellers can postpone the shipment of an item until the payment is delivered, so the sellers are not threatened financially. On the other hand, buyers pay before receiving an item, unless using a trusted third-party, such as PayPal. The reputation of buyers has little importance for sellers, who are generally interested in receiving the payment. On the contrary, the reputation of sellers is of crucial importance to buyers, who have to decide upon participating in an auction solely based on seller's reputation.
In this paper we propose two novel measures of the reputation of online auction participants. Instead of using simple participation counts, we propose to use data mining to analyze the topology of the network of seller-buyer connections to derive useful knowledge about each participant. Building upon social network analysis techniques we extract two notions that characterize auction participants: credibility and density. Our original contribution includes the definition of those novel measures, the construction of efficient algorithms to compute them, and the experimental evaluation of the proposal. We use real-world data acquired from www.allegro.pl, a leading Polish online auction site, to empirically prove the feasibility and benefit of our measures. This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the related work. Section 3 introduces the concept of credibility and presents an algorithm used to compute it. In Sect. 4 we define the notion of density of participants. The results of the experimental evaluation of our proposal are presented in Sect. 5. Finally, the paper concludes with a future work agenda in Sect. 6.
Related Work
Reputation systems [11] are commonly used to build trust on the Internet, where millions of individuals perform commercial transactions without knowing each other. Web-based auction sites typically rely on trust models in which credibility of participants is assessed by counting positive and negative feedbacks received from their trading partners after each auction [6] . A critical analysis of this simple model can be found in [8] . The author points to the subjective nature of feedbacks, the lack of feedback context, the need to perform feedback aging. Of particular importance is the fact that positive and negative feedbacks are highly asymmetric. Users provide positive feedbacks willingly, but they refrain from providing a negative feedback in the fear of retaliation. Indeed, a negative feedback is usually issued when the quality of service becomes totally unacceptable. Otherwise, users choose not to provide a feedback at all. Thus, traditional feedback-based reputation systems grossly overestimate the reputation of users (particularly of sellers) by not considering these missing feedbacks.
Several solutions have been recently proposed to address some limitations of current feedback-based models. In [1] the authors introduced a complaint-only trust management method. A method presented in [4] evaluates the quality of feedbacks assuming that a feedback is credible if it is consistent with the majority of feedbacks for a given user. The authors of [2] proposed to introduce a trusted third party that could be used to authorize, identify, and establish the reputation of auction participants. A comparison of fraud mechanisms in online auctions and pay-per-call industry in the early 1990s can be found in [13] . The author states that the existing efforts of the online auction industry self-regulation are not adequate and would not solve the problem, hence legal action must be undertaken by the government to provide consumers with protection. In [14] a trust model called PeerTrust for peer-to-peer e-commerce communities was proposed. The presented model includes several trust parameters, such as the feedback in terms of satisfaction, number of transactions, credibility of feedback, transaction context, and community context. An interesting idea of trust and distrust propagation was formulated in [5] . The authors present a method to compute trust between any two individuals based on a small amount of explicit trust and distrust statements per individual.
In our approach, rather than trying to solve all the problems with reputation assessment in Web-based auctions, we focus on just one issue that we believe is the most important, i.e. the credibility of the feedback. We go a step further than [14] with the goal of discovering networks of artificial auction participants created by cheating sellers and providing reciprocal positive comments. We mine the network of auction participants to derive knowledge on seller's credibility that would be independent of other users' feedbacks.
The problem of evaluating the importance of Web pages by Web search engines can be regarded as similar to the problem of reputation assessment in online auctions. In terms of implementation details our method for credibility assessment in online auctions is similar to an algorithm proposed to evaluate the quality of Web pages, called HITS (hyperlink-induced topic search) presented in [7] . HITS divides pages into authorities (covering a certain topic) and hubs (directory-like pages linking to authorities devoted to a certain topic). In our method, we apply a similar distinction, dividing auction participants into those that are mainly sellers and those that are mainly buyers. Our second method, i.e. the assessment of seller density, is similar to density-based clustering schemes.
Credibility of Participants
Given a set of buyers B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } and a set of sellers S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m }. Given a set of possible feedbacks F = {−1, 0, 1}, where each value represents the "negative", "neutral", and "positive" feedback, respectively. Given a set of auctions
In our model a feedback for an auction is intentionally undirected, which requires an explanation. It is true that both parties involved in an auction mutually post feedbacks. Almost always the first person to post a feedback is the buyer (in the examined dataset a buyer posted the first feedback in 83% of auctions). Seller's feedback is merely a confirmation of buyer's feedback. Table 1 presents mutual feedbacks from a random sample of 50 000 auctions. In 99.5% of auctions feedbacks posted by buyers and sellers were the same. We believe that the information conveyed by seller's feedbacks is useless, thus we use only the feedback posted by the buyer. Reputations of sellers and buyers are independent of each other despite the true identity of participants. In other words, the fact that a person can be a seller and a buyer at the same time is not considered. In our opinion this simplification is justified in practice and it reflects the real behavior of online auction participants who form distinct and well separated clusters of buyers and sellers. Upon the termination of the algorithm vectors S C and B C contain diversified credibility ratings for sellers and buyers, respectively. A reputation rating for a buyer b j is a tuple R(b j ) = C − , C 0 , C + .
Require: A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 
end for 6.
for all b j ∈ B do 7.
end for 9. until vectors S C and B C converge 10. Output S C and B C as credibility ratings 11. Compute reputation ratings R(b j ), R(s k ) ∀b j ∈ B, ∀s k ∈ S using S C , B C , and A Our method of reputation rating estimation is based on the following recursive definition of credibility. We consider a given buyer to be highly credible if the buyer participates in many auctions involving credible sellers. Analogously, we define a given seller to be credible if the seller participates in many auctions involving credible buyers. Since there is no a priori estimation of credibility of participants, we assume that initially all participants have equal credibility. Then, we iteratively recompute the credibility of sellers and buyers in the following way. In each iteration we distribute the current credibility of each buyer among participating sellers. Next, we update the credibility of all sellers by aggregating credibility collected from participating buyers. After the credibility of sellers has been updated, we propagate current credibility of sellers to buyers and we refresh the appropriate ratings. We repeat this procedure several times until the credibility of sellers and buyers converge. Alternatively, the procedure can be repeated a given number of times. Our experiments suggest that in practical applications ten iterations are sufficient to estimate the credibility correctly. After assessing the credibility of all participants the credibility ratings can be used together with the database of past feedbacks to derive the proper reputation ratings by aggregating the credibility of contractors grouped by the type of the feedback issued after an auction.
The algorithm, presented in Fig. 1 , works as follows. First, all required structures are initialized as explained above. Next, the algorithm begins to iteratively recompute the credibility for sellers and buyers. The intuition behind the algorithm is that the credibility of "good" buyers quickly aggregates in "good" sellers and vice versa. Initial ratings consisting of simple participation counts are quickly replaced by the true credibility which reflects the importance of every participant. Casual auction participants receive significant recommendation ratings only if they trade with highly ranked sellers, otherwise their initial unitary recommendation rating dissolves among lowly rated sellers.
Presented algorithm interestingly safeguards against two popular schemes of reputation rating deception. Ballot stuffing, which is a conspiracy between a seller and a group of buyers in order to unfairly augment the reputation rating of a seller, is prevented by a quick decrease in the reputation of such buyers. This can be attributed to the fact that, accordingly to the algorithm, buyers trading with a few sellers are generally not considered trustworthy, especially when the credibility of these sellers is not significant. On the other hand, a buyer trading occasionally with a few selected sellers with high credibility will eventually maintain a reasonable credibility. An attempt to create a clique of participants who try to mutually increase their reputation ratings is also prevented by the algorithm. In such case, the algorithm discovers a subset of participants with constant reputation rating. An artificial clique is indeed a closed system with no inflow or outflow of credibility. The detection of such a closed system quickly leads to the discovery of fraudulent collaboration between dishonest participants.
Density of Sellers
The main drawback of the credibility assessment method presented in Sect. 3 is the fact, that the credibility of a user depends on the credibility of other users directly involved in auctions with a given user. This encourages us to propose a novel measure of user credibility that indirectly employs information about participating users. We restrict our measure only to sellers, because, as we have already pointed out, the credibility of sellers is more important from the economical point of view.
We say that two sellers s i and s j are linked if there exist at least min_buyers who finalized an auction with both sellers, and the final price of each auction was at least min_value. The number n ij of such buyers is called the strength of the link and is denoted as |link(s i , s j )|. We define the neighborhood N(s i ) of a seller s i as the set of sellers {s j } with whom the seller s i is linked, given user-defined thresholds min_buyers and min_value. We call the cardinality of the neighborhood N(s i ) the density of the neighborhood. The threshold min_buyers is used to select only sellers with a significant volume of sales. The threshold min_value is used to protect against cheaters trying to impersonate credible sellers using the "accumulation" fraud. Note that this measure does not take into account the strength of the link between any two sellers, only the number of other sellers in a given seller's neighborhood. Therefore, we introduce another measure, called score, and defined as
The score measure is similar to the density measure, it uses the density of each seller in the neighborhood of the current seller and multiplies it by the strength of the link between the two. The logarithm is used to reduce the impact of very strong links between sellers. This measure favors big sellers with significant volume of sales, but performs similarly to the density measure. Therefore, in the rest of this section we confine the description to the density measure only.
The rationale behind the density measure is the following: a buyer who buys from two different sellers acknowledges the quality of both sellers. Experienced buyers who buy many items are used to link sellers, so we naturally discard less reliable information from unexperienced buyers. The fact that two sellers are linked indicates that either their product offer is very similar (e.g., both sellers sell used books and there are many buyers who buy books from both sellers), or that their offer is complementary (e.g., one seller sells computers and the other seller sells peripherals). Of course, the link between any two sellers may be purely coincidental, but we believe that this is the case of sellers with low density. Clusters with high density represent groups of very credible sellers.
The main benefit of the density measure is that it is very resistant to fraud. Consider a malicious seller trying to enter a cluster of reliable sellers. Linking to a single seller requires the cheater to create min_buyers artificial identities and investing at least min_buyers * min_value in winning auctions of a credible seller. Such investment still links the cheater to only one seller, so in order to receive higher density the cheater has to repeat this procedure several times. This feature of the density measure stems from the fact that it indirectly uses other sellers to rate a current seller. A seller is not judged directly from cooperating buyers (who are easy targets for manipulation and deception). Instead, a seller is rated based on information that is outside of the scope of direct manipulation by the seller. A seller has almost no control over other sellers, their density and their buyers, so the cost of manipulation becomes prohibitively high. On the contrary, traditional reputation systems rate sellers based on feedbacks from buyers, and this information can be directly manipulated by malicious sellers (e.g., by creating artificial buyer identities).
The density-based reputation measure is used to provide users with automatic recommendations. When opening a page containing a given item, a user is presented with a set of top n dense sellers, who belong to the same cluster as the seller of the given item. Therefore, the user gains access to auctions of reliable sellers who trade goods that are similar to the searched item. Most notably, the recommendation depends on neither textual descriptions provided by sellers nor category assignments of items. This is an important feature of the recommendation system, because it allows to generate description-independent and taxonomy-independent suggestions.
Experimental Results
The data have been acquired from www.allegro.pl, the leading Polish provider of online auctions. Allegro uses a simple auction protocol: each auction has an explicit deadline and all current bids are exposed to all participants, users may use a proxy which performs stepwise bidding until the maximum bid defined by a user has been reached. The dataset contains information on 440 000 participants and 400 000 terminated auctions (with 1 400 000 bids). We have chosen 10 000 different sellers and for this group we have selected all their auctions and participants of these auctions during a period of six months. The selection of sellers was based on their geographical location (a large city). In the examined dataset the average rating (the reputation Fig. 2 Seller credibility measure used by the online auction site) was 81.92, the average price of items was 70 PLN (ca. $22), and the average number of auctions per seller was 29. Among the selected sellers 70% had the rating of 78 or less, and only 1% of sellers had the rating of 1000 and more. This means that the vast majority of selected sellers did not represent large retailers using online auction site as yet another channel of distribution, but rather these were casual sellers with low volume of sales. Analogously, we have selected 10 000 buyers and for this group we have collected information on all auctions and their participants during a period of six months. Therefore, we had access to full information on 20 000 users, and partial information on another 420 000 users. All experiments are conducted on Pentium IV 2.4 GHz with 480 MB of memory. Data are stored and preprocessed using Oracle 10g database. Figure 2 depicts the convergence of credibility in subsequent iterations for selected sellers. Numbers in parentheses represent currently used reputation counts for those sellers. Observe that the relative difference in credibility for sellers (1242) and (171) is smaller than for reputation counts. Also note that credibility estimation converges after only a few iterations. The results of credibility estimation for a group buyers are depicted in Fig. 3 . One can easily notice that the credibility as defined by us is not a linear function of reputation counts. Again, we observe that the computations converge after only a few iterations.
For testing of density and score measures we used the set of 10 000 sellers for whom we had data on all auctions during the period of six months. We choose threshold values min_buyers = 3 and min_value = 50 PLN (ca. $15). Figure 4 presents the distribution of density in the examined set. Most sellers have density lower than 6, but we also observe sellers with very high density exceeding 100. Around 10% of all examined sellers turned out to be dense (1026 out of 10 000). Figure 5 presents the distribution of average rating with respect to density. This result supports our claim that high density represents reliable and credible sellers, one can easily notice that the average rating grows quickly with the increase of the density. Figure 6 presents the number of linked pairs of sellers and the number of dense sellers when increasing the value of the min_buyers threshold. As can be seen, even for small threshold value the number of pairs and the number of dense sellers becomes manageable. For instance, when min_buyers = 1 the threshold selects 85% of sellers who form over 5 million linked pairs (the latter value is not shown on the plot). Increasing min_buyers threshold to 2 selects 35% of sellers who form ca. 32 000 linked pairs. Figure 7 presents analogous results for varying the values of the min_price threshold, when min_buyers = 2.
An interesting experiment examines the properties of clusters of densely connected sellers. Figure 8 presents the changes in the number of discovered clusters when varying min_price and min_buyers thresholds. As can be seen, the min_price threshold has stronger impact on the number of discovered clusters, except when min_buyers = 1. The number of clusters is relatively small and for most combinations of both thresholds the space of sellers is dominated by a few clusters (usually with one main cluster being significantly bigger than the others). Figure 9 presents the size of the biggest discovered cluster for a given combination of min_price and min_buyers thresholds. When no thresholds are set, almost all sellers are assigned to a single cluster. Interestingly, this result suggests that Milgram's concept of six degrees of separation applies also to the online auction environment (when discovering the borders of each cluster we never used more than five iterations to identify all members of the cluster). Another thing to notice is the fact, that the min_price threshold has very little impact on the size of the biggest cluster when more than two links are used to connect sellers. For realistic settings of both thresholds the size of the biggest cluster becomes relatively small, which makes this approach suitable for automatic recommendation generation. We believe that only the most trustworthy and reliable sellers are left in the clusters, thus making respective clusters a valid source of meaningful recommendation. Figures 10 and 11 show projections of density and score on currently used rating value. Interestingly, we find many sellers with very high rating (above 500 auctions) with very low density. Of course, these could be users who trade low-value goods (e.g. used books, small collectibles, etc.) and they are being punished by relatively high min_value threshold. On the other hand, the average price of auctions in the examined set was close to 90 PLN (ca. $28), so we do not feel that our setting was too prohibitive. Figure 11 reveals a significant shift along the x-axis. This suggests that the sellers with low density and high rating have much higher average strength of the link than densely connected sellers.
Finally, Figs. 12 and 13 show the impact of density on the average number of sales and the average price of items for each seller. We discover that the density is a good predictor of the volume of sales, and sellers with high density enjoy a much higher number of auctions. On the other hand, there is no clear indication whether the density of a seller impacts the average price of offered goods. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented two novel measures for reputation rating in the online auction environment. Our measures, credibility and density, evaluate the reputation of auction participants by mining the topology of the network of seller-buyer relationships to retrieve useful knowledge. We believe that the patterns that we discover in the network provide additional insight into user characteristics and can be used as a predictor of user reliability. The experiments prove the practical usability and applicability of the presented solution. Our work extends previous proposals in the number of ways, namely, it considers the structure of inter-participant relationships and computes the reputation ratings iteratively by simulating the flow of credibility between auction participants. The results of conducted experiments encourage us to follow the research in the area. For the moment, we compute the reputation of a buyer and a seller disjointly, even if they are the same physical person. The next step is to combine the information about these reputation ratings for every distinct individual. An interesting, yet often disregarded, feature of online bidding is the timing of the bid. We believe that the timing carries valuable knowledge about the nature of the bid and can be successfully used to discover fraud. Finally, our experiments were conducted on a fairly small subset of the original data. Due to the immense popularity of online auctions, the volume of data to be analyzed poses a significant challenge. We plan to scale the algorithms to allow for almost real-time analysis of huge amounts of raw data.
